The unconventional monetary policy actions of the Federal Reserve during the recent Global Financial Crisis often involve implicit subsidies to banks. This paper o¤ers a theory of the non-neutrality of money associated with capital injection into banks via nominal transfers, in an environment where banking frictions are present in the sense that there exists an agency problem between banks and their private-sector creditors. The analysis is conducted within a general equilibrium setting with two-sided …nancial contracting. We …rst show that even with perfect nominal ‡exibility, the recapitalization policy has real e¤ects on the economy. We then introduce banking riskiness shocks and study optimal policy responses to such shocks.
Introduction
The Federal Reserve took a variety of unconventional policy actions to cope with the recent Global Financial Crisis (GFC). As traditional interest rate policy that adjusts the federal funds rate was perceived to be ine¤ective (Cecchetti, 2009 ), the Fed adopted various measures of the so-called "unconventional monetary policy." 1 In addition to injecting liquidity into the …nancial system (Brunnermeier, 2009 ), some of the Fed's policy measures also had the ‡avor of providing capital subsidy to banks, a point forcefully made by Cecchetti (2009) . This is certainly true when the Fed directly purchased assets previously held by banks, such as mortgage backed securities, at above market prices. It can also be argued that lending by the Fed during the crisis almost always involved subsidies. By accepting collaterals at prices that were almost surely above their actual market prices (Tett, 2008) and charging lower interest rates (relative to the federal funds rate) when banks were actually perceived by the market to be exposed to greater risks, Fed lending in e¤ect recapitalized the borrowing banks through nominal transfers: On one hand, reserves and monetary base were created. On the other hand, banks were getting more funds than they could borrow from the market for the same interest rates and the same collateral assets. During the early phase of the crisis, the Fed attempted to stimulate discount borrowing, which is collateralized, by reducing substantially the premium charged on primary discount lending over the federal funds rate target and raising the term of lending from overnight to as long as three months. In addition, to remove the stigma attached to discount borrowing 2 , the Fed created the Term Auction Facility (TAF) in December 2007 and enlarged it later on in order to better provide funds to banks that need them most. The rules of the TAF allowed banks to pledge collaterals that might otherwise have little market value. With few exceptions, the interest rates paid on TAF loans were near or below the expected primary discount lending rate. 3 To be sure, the unconventional monetary policy is multi-faceted. This paper focuses on one particular aspect of the policy, namely, implicit capital subsidy to banks …nanced by money creation. In light of the celebrated Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) , such recapitalization policy would be ine¤ective in stimulating employment and output in a world where banks can frictionlessly raise funds to …nance the loans they make, as the capital structure of banks would be irrelevant for their lending activities and the real market value of their loan portfolios. In that kind of world the classical dichotomy holds and recapitalization of banks by the monetary authority is neutral, despite that it does involve a real transfer that enlarges banks' net worth relative to debt (because other sectors of the economy are not getting the same nominal transfer). However, as will be demonstrated in this paper, once an agency problem is introduced to the relationship between banks and their private-sector creditors (henceforth "depositors" for ease of exposition) 4 , the Modigliani-Miller theorem fails for banks, the classical dichotomy breaks down, and money is no longer neutral when central bank policy takes the form of injecting money to the banking system to increase bank capital. In particular, a bank recapitalization e¤ort by the monetary authority triggers a redistribution of wealth in favor of the banks, lowers their debt-equity ratio and costs of external …nance, hence stimulates bank lending and raises employment and output. Importantly, this non-neutrality result obtains 3 For details, see Cecchetti (2009) . The quantity of TAF lending turned out to be large. In January 2009 they constituted more than one …fth of the Fed's total assets. Similar programs established by the Fed include the Term Securities Lending Facility, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility, etc. 4 It should be clari…ed here that we use the term "deposits" in the broadest sense, referring to all liabilities of banks that are held by the private sector. Meanwhile, we lump all the private-sector creditors of banks into a single category of agents called "depositors." We also lump all types of banks into a single banking sector. even without any kind of nominal rigidities. 5 The potency of the bank recapitalization policy allows it to be used as a stabilization tool when the economy is subject to shocks to the riskiness of banking. 6 Needless to say, understanding the mechanism through which policy works is crucial for assessing the e¤ectiveness of central bank reactions to the crisis. Impotent policy is clearly not interesting. The main thrust of the paper is that to make sense of the bank recapitalization policy, one has to take seriously frictions on the liability side of the bank balance sheet, i.e., frictions in the relationship between banks and depositors. The reason is that it is precisely frictions on this side, rather than frictions on the asset side, that are responsible for the real e¤ects of bank recapitalization policy. As is already well known, on the asset side of the bank balance sheet there might exist informational asymmetry regarding the ability of (non…nancial) …rms to repay their loans, giving rise to an agency problem between banks and …rms as emphasized in the seminal work of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and a large literature that follows. 7 Frictions of this kind are the literature's main focus thus far. We shall refer to them as "credit frictions," for the sake of distinguishing it from the informational asymmetry and agency problem on the liability side of the bank balance sheet, which we shall call "banking frictions." To introduce the latter kind of frictions we apply the costly-state-veri…cation (CSV) framework of Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985) , and Williamson (1986) to the bank-depositor relationship. In our model banks face idiosyncratic risks and depositors have to expend monitoring costs in order to verify banks'capacities to repay. We emphasize that bank recapitalization by the monetary authority is neutral when banking frictions are absent, even if the conventionally studied credit 5 Diamond and Rajan (2006) analyze how changes in money supply a¤ect real activities through a liquidity version of the bank lending channel, without relying on sticky prices, reserve requirements, or deposit insurance. 6 The extent of banking riskiness is represented by a dispersion parameter in the distribution of idiosyncratic bank risks and is assumed to stochastic in the paper. 7 Examples include Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), Fisher (1999) , and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2003, 2009), etc. frictions are present. This implies that what credit frictions do is at best to amplify and propagate the policy's real e¤ects which are brought forth solely by the existence of banking frictions.
We are thus compelled to give special attention to the roles banking frictions play. Modeling banking frictions and studying their implications for the e¤ects of bank recapitalization policy is precisely the goal of this paper.
In a model that allows for perfect nominal ‡exibility, some other sort of frictions must be employed to generate the non-neutrality of money. In Lucas' (1972) misperceptions theory it is the imperfect information about the overall price level that temporarily misleads suppliers and generates real e¤ects of money supply shocks. It seems that information on money supply and other policy instruments is available to the public with little delay so there is no serious signal extraction problem to solve. Hence the misperceptions story might not be particularly relevant for studying the e¤ects of unconventional monetary policy. In contrast, this paper assumes full information on all aggregate variables but uses a di¤erent kind of information problem to generate the non-neutrality of money. The problem here concerns costly revelation of banks' information to depositors, which leads to the breakdown of the Modigliani-Miller theorem and gives rise to a nontrivial role for banks'capital structure. The basic framework of banking frictions this paper builds on is laid out in Zeng (2002) . The current paper presents a two-period model with risk averse depositors. An in…nite-horizon version with risk neutral depositors is analyzed in Zeng (2010) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the economic environment, the agents and their …nancial relationships, as well as the production and information structure. Section 3 analyzes two-sided …nancial contracting with idiosyncratic bank risks. The general equilibrium e¤ects of the bank recapitalization policy and the optimal stabilization policy are studied in Section 4. The last section concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The Model

The Environment
There are four types of agents in the economy-saver/depositors, bankers, entrepreneurs, and workers. Entrepreneurs own the production technologies and operate the …rms. They need to hire labor from the workers but are short of funds in paying the wage bills if they do not borrow from the banks in advance. Banks, which are run by the bankers, in turn secure funds from the saver/depositors to …nance their lending activities. The …nancial contracting problem is thus two-sided: Banks sign loan contracts with the …rms and deposit contracts with the depositors.
To simplify the analysis, we a consider a two-period setup. 8 Production uses capital and labor and takes place only in period 1. We assume that each …rm owns the same …xed amount of physical capital K f , and that each bank owns the same …xed amount K b . There is a competitive rental market with rental rate R k . And the rental income of capital constitutes the …rms and banks'internal funds. 9 Since the …rms'internal funds are generated entirely from the current rental value of the capital stock they own, in a market clearing equilibrium they must borrow additional funds to …nance their purchase of labor inputs supplied by the workers plus rental services provided by the stock of physical capital owned by the banks. The paper thus emphasizes working capital …nancing as in Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) . Our model di¤ers from theirs in that …nancial frictions are in ‡icted on the …rms'purchases of factor inputs, giving rise to a …nancially distorted labor market. In essence, what we are proposing is a …nance-augmented neoclassical theory of production and employment. 8 An in…nite-horizon version of the model is presented in Zeng (2010) , who assumes perfect insurance among the depositors so that they are e¤ectively risk-neutral with respect to bank risks. This assumption allows for the usage of a representative-household setup when characterizing the saving behavior. In the present paper there is no perfect insurance among the depositors. Agents receiving di¤erent shocks will end up with di¤erent levels of wealth. We choose to work with the two-period, rather than in…nite-horizon, setup in order to avoid the di¢ culty of keeping track of the distribution of money balances across the risk-averse depositors, which would complicate the analysis without adding much more insight. 9 As capital is productive only in period 1, its price is zero in period 2 and equals the rental rate in period 1.
At the beginning of period 1, the agents are endowed with initial money balances of certain amounts. Since the government provides nominal transfers (money injections) before …nancial contracts are negotiated in the period, these initial balances are irrelevant. What matters is the amount of money balances held by each type of agents that results after the transfers are made.
Let the after-transfer money balance be M d for each depositor, M b for each bank, and M w for each worker (for simplicity assume that the …rms do not receive any money balance). The total amount of after-transfer money balance is then
There is a risk-free bond of zero supply. The interest rate on this bond, i.e., the risk-free nominal interest rate, is pegged by the government at R > 1. 10 The funds circulate in the following way. First, the sum of M d and M b is channelled by the banks and goes to the …rms to purchase labor L in the competitive labor market at nominal wage rate W . In fact, the loan market clears when 11
The sum then becomes labor income at the hands of the workers. The workers use W L plus their after-transfer money balance M w to purchase consumption goods C 1 at price level P 1 .
That is, P 1 C 1 = W L + M w . Substituting (1) into this budget equation, we obtain the quantity equation:
The sum of money M is received by the …rms as revenues. It is then divided among the …rms, 1 0 The ability of the government to …x R in addition to the money balances is derived from the assumption that the savers consume in the second period only. Having R pegged allows us to abstract away from the e¤ect of money injections on the extent of monetary distortions and to concentrate on …nancial distortions. See Zeng (2010) for an alternative setup that endogenizes the risk-free nominal interest rate and introduces a potential tradeo¤ between monetary and …nancial distortions. 1 1 The loan market clearing condition takes the form (1) because the …rms'rental payment on capital is covered by the rental value of the stock of capital owned by the …rms and banks. It remains that their wage bills are to be ultimately …nanced by the after-transfer money balances of the banks and depositors. To write the loan market clearing condition in full, we have
banks, and depositors according to the …nancial contracts and carried over by these agents to period 2 to purchase consumption goods. We assume that there are output endowments in period 2 given by C 2 > 0. The period-2 price level is thus P 2 = M=C 2 . At the end of period 2, all of the money stock M retires. Figure 1 illustrates the ‡ow of funds in the model. The workers work and consume only in period 1. They have constant marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption, given by > 0. Hence the real wage rate W=P 1 always equals . We treat the workers as being risk neutral since they do not face any idiosyncratic uncertainty at all: They always receive the full payment of wages since the …rms must deliver this payment before labor can be provided. In contrast, the depositors, bankers, and entrepreneurs, who for simplicity only consume in period 2, all face idiosyncratic uncertainty. We assume that the bankers and entrepreneurs are risk neutral, but the depositors are risk averse, with logarithmic utility function. In the …nancial relationships among these three parties, the banks face risks of default by the …rms that borrow from them, and the depositors face risks of default by the banks where they made deposits.
The focus of our analysis is on how the distribution of purchasing powers in period 1 (the relative fractions of M d and M b in M ) a¤ects the terms of …nancial contracts negotiated, which in turn a¤ect the quantity of labor input and output produced in that period. Note that the terms of …nancial contracts also determine the division of …rm revenues M among the contracting parties and hence the distribution of period-2 purchasing powers (claims on consumption goods) among the depositors, bankers, and entrepreneurs. Put in a di¤erent way, the division of surplus (in the form of future consumption) as dictated by the …nancial contracts has non-trivial implications for current employment and production. Before analyzing the …nancial contracting problem a detailed description of the production and information structure is necessary.
The Production and Information Structure
Production in period 1 takes place in an environment with a unit-mass continuum of regions indexed by i, i 2 [0; 1]. In region i there is one bank, called bank i, and a unit-mass continuum of …rms indexed by ij, j 2 [0; 1]. Each …rm resides in a distinct location and is owned by an entrepreneur, who operates a stochastic production technology that transforms labor and capital services into a homogeneous …nal output. The technology of …rm ij is represented by the production function
where y ij ; k ij ; and l ij denote …nal output, capital input, and labor input, respectively, of …rm ij. The function F ( ) is linearly homogeneous, increasing and concave in its two arguments, and satis…es the usual Inada conditions. All sources of idiosyncratic risks are captured in the productivity factor, with i being the random productivity speci…c to region i, and ! ij the random productivity speci…c to location ij. We assume that i is identical and independently distributed across regions, with c.d.f. r ( ) and p.d.f. r ( ), and that ! ij is identical and independently distributed across locations, with c.d.f. l ( ) and p.d.f. l ( ). Both i and ! ij have non-negative support and unit mean. Furthermore, i and ! j , i; ; j 2 [0; 1] are uncorrelated with each other. The distributions are known by all agents in the economy. Once the …rms acquire factor inputs, production takes place, and the region and location speci…c productivities realize. The …nal output is sold in a competitive goods market.
We use the CSV approach of Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985) , and Williamson
(1986) to model …nancial frictions and …nancial contracting. It is assumed that there is an ex post informational asymmetry regarding borrowers'revenues. In particular, only borrowers themselves can costlessly observe their realized revenues, while lenders have to expend a veri-…cation cost in order to observe the same object. In our environment only …rm ij can observe at no cost s f ij i ! ij , and only bank i can observe i costlessly. For a bank to observe s f ij (or ! ij ) and for a depositor to observe i , veri…cation costs have to be incurred. Note that by lending to a continuum of …rms in a particular region each bank e¤ectively diversi…es away all the …rm/location speci…c risks. But the region speci…c risk is not diversi…able, giving rise to the possibility that a bank becomes insolvent when an adverse regional shock occurs. Our model thus features potential bankruptcy of banks in addition to bankruptcy of non…nancial …rms. Note that even if the working capital loans are perfectly safe for the banks (no default by the …rms), the depositors still regard their claims on the banks as being risky due to the informational asymmetry on the idiosyncratic bank/region productivities.
The concept of "regions" should not be interpreted literally as re ‡ecting geographic areas, albeit this is certainly one of the many possible interpretations. Rather, it is a device designed to generate risks idiosyncratic to individual banks. If banks are subject to risks that cannot be fully diversi…ed, then the kind of agency problem between banks and …rms applies equally well to the relationship between banks and depositors. In that case there are needs to "monitor the monitor," in the terminology of Krasa and Villamil (1992a) . Bank-level risks might stem from geographic con…nement of an individual bank's operation to speci…c areas, as in the U.S. when out-of-state branching was restricted (see Williamson, 1989) . They might also be due to the concentration of a bank's lending activities in speci…c industries. Savings and loan associations in the U.S., which historically concentrated on mortgage loans, was a good example. It should be noted that even without branching restrictions or regulations on banks'lending and investment activities, an individual bank might optimally choose to limit its scale and/or scope of operation so that the risks associated with its lending activities are not fully diversi…ed. An example appears in Krasa and Villamil (1992b) , who consider the trade-o¤ involved in increasing the size of a bank's portfolio (i.e., lending to additional borrowers). In their model balancing the gains from decreased default risk with the losses from increased monitoring costs leads to an optimal scale for banks. Another example is Cerasi and Daltung (2000) , who introduce considerations on the internal organization of banks that render scale economies in the banking sector rapidly exhausted. 12 In this paper we follow Krasa and Villamil (1992a) and Zeng (2007) to assume that an individual bank cannot contract with a su¢ cient variety of borrowers so that the credit risks are not perfectly diversi…able. The model thus di¤ers from Diamond (1984) and Williamson (1986) , where the size of the …nancial intermediary grows without bound so that the cost of delegation vanishes in the limit.
3 Financial Contracting with Banking Risks
The Two-Sided Debt Contract
The three groups of players in the …nancial market-…rms, banks, and depositors-are connected via a two-sided contract structure. Both sides of the contract, one between the …rms and banks and the other between the banks and depositors-…t into a generic framework we now describe.
Here attention is restricted to deterministic monitoring. 13 Since the borrowers (…rms and banks) are assumed to be risk neutral, the optimal contract between a generic borrower and a generic lender takes the form of a standard debt contract, in Gale and Hellwig (1985) 's term. Note that with risk averse depositors standard debt contracts are optimal not only because they minimize 1 2 Speci…cally, loan o¢ cers, who are the ones actually making loans, have to be monitored by the banker. 1 3 The assumption of deterministic monitoring is actually less restrictive than it appears. Krasa and Villamil (2000) articulates a costly enforcement model that justi…es deterministic monitoring when commitment is limited and enforcement is costly and imperfect. See also Mookherjee and Png (1989) and Boyd and Smith (1994) on deterministic versus stochastic monitoring. Krasa and Villamil (1994) analyze optimal multilateral contracts when veri…cation technology is either deterministic or stochastic. Strategic interaction between multiple …nanciers is considered by Khalil, Martimort, and Parigi (2007) . the need for monitoring, but also because they provide optimal risk sharing. 14 Suppose that the borrower's revenue is given by V s, where V is a component freely observable to both the borrower and the lender, and s 0 is a unit-mean risky component that is subject to informational asymmetry, whereby the borrower can costlessly observe s while the lender has to expend a veri…cation cost in order to do so. The veri…cation cost is assumed to be times the borrower's revenue, with 2 (0; 1). The c.d.f. of s, given by ( ), is common knowledge.
The contract speci…es a set of realizations of s for which monitoring occurs, together with a payment schedule. An incentive compatible contract must specify a …xed payment for s in the non-monitoring set, otherwise the borrower will always report the value of s for which the payment is lowest among non-monitoring states. A standard debt contract with monitoring threshold s is an incentive compatible contract with the following features: (i) the monitoring set is fsjs < sg, (ii) the …xed payment is V s for s 2 fsjs sg, and (iii) the payment is V s for s 2 fsjs < sg. The standard debt contract is particularly interesting because it resembles many …nancial contracts in the real world. It features …xed payment for non-default states and state-contingent payment when default occurs. Requiring the borrower to repay as much as possible in default states allows the …xed payment for non-default states to be minimized, thus minimizing the probability of veri…cation and thus the expected monitoring cost.
Under the standard debt contract, the borrower and the lender each obtains a share of the
re ‡ecting the fact that with s above s; the borrower gives out the …xed payment V s and keeps the remaining, while with s below s, all revenues are con…scated by the lender. The lender
When s is larger than or equal to s, which occurs with probability 1 ( s), the lender recoups the …xed proportion s of the expected revenue V . If s falls below s, the lender takes all of the realized revenue while expending a veri…cation cost which equals a fraction of the revenue. 15 The following assumption on the distribution of s is imposed. where the primes denote derivatives with respect to s andŝ satis…es 1 (ŝ) ŝ (ŝ) = 0.
We rule out the possibility of credit rationing by requiring V (ŝ; ) to be no less than the opportunity cost of funds for the lender (see Williamson, 1986) . Thus the domain of s we are interested in is [0;ŝ) and 0 ( s; ) > 0 on this interval. 17 It is interesting to note that changes in the monitoring threshold (and hence the default probability) generate redistributions of the 1 5 Note that ( s; )+ ( s; ) = 1 R s 0 sd (s) < 1, indicating that there is a direct deadweight loss R s 0 sd (s) due to costly monitoring. 1 6 The assumption that s (s) = [1 (s)] is increasing in s is weaker than the increasing hazard assumption commonly made in the incentive contract literature, which requires (s) = [1 (s)] to be monotonically increasing in s. Yet the latter property is already satis…ed by a fairly large class of distributions. 1 7 If the lender has logarithmic utility then the relevantŝ is the one that maximizes the function~ de…ned in (14) below. expected revenue between the borrower and the lender. An increase in s reduces the share received by the borrower, while raising the share received by the lender. The total e¤ect on the returns to the two parties, however, is negative since the marginal increase in the lender's share is less than the marginal increase in the borrower's share, re ‡ecting the additional monitoring cost born by the lender at the margin.
We now apply this generic debt contract framework to the bank-…rm relationship. The …rm's revenue can be written as V f !, where V f P F (k; l) is freely observable to the bank, and
! is the risk that can be observed by the bank only with a cost. 18 The bank-…rm contract speci…es a monitoring threshold, denoted by !, for the …rm/location speci…c productivity !.
Conditional on the region speci…c productivity , the expected return to the …rm is then given by P F (k; l) f !; l and the revenue of the bank from lending to the …rms in its region is
in (4) and (5) . 19 The contracting problem between the bank and its depositors speci…es a monitoring threshold for the bank risk . To …t this into the generic setup, write the bank's revenue as V b , where
Here !-the monitoring threshold in the bank-…rm contract-is freely observable to both the bank and the depositors. Let represent the monitoring threshold for in the bank-depositor contract. Then the expected return to the bank from the contract is ; r obtain from substituting ; r for ( s; ) in (4) and (5) . Note, however, that with risk aversion, what the depositors care is their expected utility, which obviously di¤ers from the expected …nancial return o¤ered by the contract. Details are provided in the next subsection. 1 8 From the bank's perspective, monitoring s f ! is equivalent to monitoring ! given its information in .
Optimal Competitive Contract
To motivate competitive banking assume that in principle a bank is allowed to operate beyond its region. But that entails a …xed cost. If this cost goes to zero, then the limit case is perfect competition for the banking industry, where each bank o¤ers contracts that maximize the expected return to the …rms in its region such that the bank itself at least earns the riskless return on its own funds. We focus on this limit situation and state formally the optimal competitive contract as solving the problem below. To simplify notations, the dependence of the and functions on l and r are omitted.
where U ( ) is logarithmic and
is the expected return to the …rm, unconditional on , from the contract in period 1. Dividing this by the period-2 price level P 2 yields the entrepreneur's expected consumption and hence expected utility. Inequality 
The expected utility from the portfolio N d ; M d N d must be no less than putting all of M d into the risk-free bond, which yields expected utility U RM d =P 2 . Note that implicit in (7) is the assumption that each depositor contracts with only one bank and that there is no risk sharing among the depositors. 20 Finally, inequality (8) is the ‡ow-of-funds constraint for the …rms. The total bill for the …rms' factor inputs is R k k + W l, which has to be covered by the internal funds of the …rms themselves, N f R k K f , and bank loans that equal the sum of bank capital N b and deposits N d . In Problem 1 N f and N b are taken as given.
De…ne the "debt-equity ratios"for the bank and …rms, denoted by b and f respectively, as
As shown in the Appendix, with U ( ) taking the log-form, the solution to Problem 1 satis…es the conditions listed below, where we impose the equilibrium condition M d N d = 0 to simplify notations, without neglecting the necessity to take derivatives via the term
where
1
Equations (9) and (10) are the …rst-order conditions for factor demand, where the presence of the term q creates wedges between the marginal products of factor inputs and their real prices. We shall call q the …nancial friction indicator, as it re ‡ects the distortions caused by the agency problems in the two-sided …nancial contracting. If either ! > 0 or > 0 (or both) then q !; is strictly greater than one. Here ! > 0 indicates a positive default rate by the …rms and re ‡ects the agency costs in the bank-…rm relationship. This is what the existing literature on credit market imperfections has typically focused on. On the other hand, > 0 corresponds to a positive rate of default by the banks and re ‡ects the agency costs in the bank-depositor relationship. The variable q !; measures the overall distortions caused by the conventionally studied credit frictions and the sort of banking frictions we introduce. 21 Note that q is an increasing function of ! and , with lim !; !0 q = 1.
Equations (11) and (12) re ‡ect the fact that the optimal competitive contract entails binding IR constraints for both the bank and the depositors. Essentially, the terms of contract dictate a division of expected revenues between borrowers and lenders. Since~ d log b is increasing in , equation (11) indicates that the bank's default probability increases along with when it has a larger debt-equity ratio b . The increase in implies a larger share of expected revenues received by the depositors, relative to the share received by the bank, in the bankdepositor contract. Equation (12) indicates that given b and , the …rms'default probability increases along with ! when their debt-equity ratio f increases. The increase in ! implies a larger share of expected revenues that goes to the …rms in the bank-…rm contract.
General Equilibrium and the E¤ects of Bank Recapitalization
In this section we characterize the competitive equilibrium of the model economy and analyze how the bank recapitalization policy, taking the form of central bank money injection into the banking system, a¤ects the real economy. The optimal policy responses to shocks to the riskiness of banking will also be considered.
The Non-Neutrality of Money
To make the analysis tractable we further assume that the production function F ( ) takes the standard Cobb-Douglas form, i.e., F (K; L) = K L 1 , 2 (0; 1). This immediately implies, via (9) and (10), that (1 ) R k K = W L. Using this relationship, together with N d = M d , we have In light of (16), equations (11) and (12) 
Thus z b ; z d determines the bank default threshold via (17) and in addition the …rm default threshold ! via (18) . Given , ! (hence q), the real wage rate , and the pegged risk-free interest rate R, the equilibrium employment L is determined by the following condition F l (K; L) = q !; R :
Furthermore, consumption in period 1 (by the workers) is given by
Note that the net output factor ' !; < 1 for !; > 0, indicating a direct deadweight loss due to costly monitoring. 
must hold for the speci…cation of policy to be internally consistent. Equation (22) can be seen as a rule that the government uses to determine M w for any given speci…cation of z b ; z d ; M .
The policy vector can thus be equivalently represented by z b ; z d ; M; M w , where M w is given by (22) . 22 In period 2, the price level equals P 2 = M=C 2 given the output endowment C 2 . The terms !; of period-1 …nancial contract determine the division of C 2 among the entrepreneurs, bankers, and depositors, who only consume in period 2. The share of period-2 purchasing power possessed by each type of agents equals the share of period-1 revenues that goes to that type of agents as dictated by the contract. Hence total entrepreneurial consumption C f 2 , banker consumption C b 2 , and depositor consumption C d 2 in period 2 are given by
respectively. 23 Formally, a competitive equilibrium with banking frictions and two-sided …nancial contracting is de…ned as follows.
an allocation L; C 1 ; C f 2 ; C b 2 ; C d 2 , a price system P 1 ; W; R k ; P 2 , and terms of …nancial contract !; such that i. The period-1 contract terms and allocations, !; ; L; and C 1 , are determined by (17)- (20) given the allocation-relevant policy z b ; z d .
ii. Given M , the price levels P 1 and P 2 are determined by the quantity equations, i.e., P 1 = M=C 1 and P 2 = M=C 2 . In addition W = P 1 and R k = W L= (1 ).
iii. the period-2 consumption allocation C f 2 ; C b 2 ; C d 2 is given by (23) .
iv. M w is set in accordance with the rule (22) for any given speci…cation of z b ; z d ; M .
For analytic purpose it will be especially convenient to look at the behavior of the model economy around a situation where no default by either the banks or the …rms occurs. We de…ne such a situation as follows. in the two-sided …nancial frictions generates an increase in equilibrium employment according to (19) .
Consider the scenario when bank recapitalization, as an implicit part of the unconventional monetary policy undertaken during the GFC, is implemented. Increases in z b are not produced by directly taxing the depositors and transferring the proceeds to the banks. Rather, they are produced by injecting newly created money to the banks. The resultant increases in the aggregate amount of money balances are non-neutral as they are associated with increases in z b . They stimulate employment by lowering bank leverage and the overall extent of …nancial distortions. This non-neutrality result depends crucially on the presence of banking frictions, i.e., frictions on the liability side of the bank balance sheet due to the informational asymmetry in the bank-depositor relationship. Without such frictions, a neutrality result will obtain regardless of the value of z b ; z d . 24 These conclusions hold even with the presence of credit frictions, i.e., frictions on the asset side of the bank balance sheet due to the informational asymmetry in the bank-…rm relationship. It is therefore precisely the presence of banking frictions (and the fact that banks are the institutions being recapitalized) that is responsible for the potency of the recapitalization policy.
Banking Riskiness and Optimal Stabilization Policy
Our analysis thus far has treated the bank recapitalization policy as exogenous. In this section we investigate how the policy can be used as a stabilization tool when there are shocks to the "riskiness" of banking. To introduce the concept of banking riskiness, we assume that the bank/region speci…c productivity follows a unit-mean log-normal distribution on (0; 1),
i.e., log ( ) N 1 2 2 ; 2 , where N stands for the normal distribution. The distribution is completed by assigning a zero p.d.f. for = 0. In our model, it is the costly veri…cation of that gives rise to the bankruptcy of banks. The default rate of banks tends to zero as tends to zero from the right. Therefore the dispersion parameter captures the extent of the riskiness of banking. Here we allow to be random. Speci…cally, its realization is given by
where > 0, representing the mean level of riskiness, is a positive constant, and " is a random disturbance bounded away from . We interpret " as the banking riskiness shock. 25 In our view, shocks to banking riskiness are highly relevant in the light of the erratic behavior of the risk spreads for banks'external …nance. The historical average of the spread between the 2 4 To see this we can take away banking frictions from the model simply by assuming that the distribution of the region speci…c productivity is degenerate. It is straightforward to show that in such an environment the recapitalization policy is irrelevant for employment, output, real factor prices, and the …rms'default rate. 2 5 Our formulation of banking riskiness shocks parallels the formulation of entrepreneurial riskiness shocks in Williamson (1987) and Rostagno (2003, 2009 ), who consider the costly state veri…cation problem between …nancial intermediaries and non…nancial …rms. It is easy to see that when the policy is speci…ed as such and the banking riskiness is as speci…ed in (24), the existence and uniqueness results for the competitive equilibrium, as established in Proposition 1, remain valid. The e¢ cacy of the recapitalization policy applies as well. This enables the policy to serve as a stabilization tool in the face of banking riskiness shocks. Taking the mean recapitalization and the mean riskiness as given, we aim to analyze how the recapitalization policy can be used to bu¤er the economy from the disturbance " to banking riskiness. 27 We shall see that stabilization considerations give rise to a particular kind of policy reaction function, or policy rule, which dictates how x should respond to " in a systematic fashion. 2 6 Similarly, the risk spread faced by the …rms in the model is given by
1 . 2 7 Zeng (2010) discusses the optimal choice of .
Suppose that the goal of the stabilization policy is to insulate employment L and net output C 1 from the banking riskiness shock. This would require both the …nancial friction indicator q and the net output factor ' to be completely stabilized, which is impossible since we would have two targets and only one policy instrument. However, as shown in Zeng (2010) , compared to q the variable ' is only of second-order importance in the neighborhood of zero default. Hence, an approximately optimal policy needs only seek to stabilize the …nancial friction indicator q. Our numerical result, to be presented momentarily, shows that targeting q alone actually achieves near-complete stabilization of both q and ' and hence near-complete stabilization of C 1 . Stabilization of q also turns out to insulate the total period-2 consumption of the depositors, the risk-averse agents in the economy, from the banking riskiness shock almost perfectly. This is because the consumption share of these agents, as in (23), depends on ! and in a way similar to the dependence of q on these default thresholds. 28 Denote the value of q that would prevail without any shock by q . For the (approximately) optimal stabilization policy, q serves as the target. In order to derive the optimal policy reaction function, denote the mapping of ("; x) to q by q ("; x): The realization of " gives the value of , which, together with x, determines !; and hence q through (17) and (18) . Given ", targeting q at q amounts to setting x at x , where x satis…es q ("; x ) = q . To keep the value of q at q , an increase in " calls for a larger value of x to o¤set the e¤ect of the increased banking riskiness. Hence x varies positively with ", with x = 0 when " = 0. Such a reaction function entails recapitalization e¤orts that counteract banking riskiness: there is more (less) nominal capital transfer to the banks when banking becomes more (less) risky.
To demonstrate numerically the optimal reaction function, we calibrate the model economy as follows. Let a time period correspond to a quarter. We set R = 1:014, consistent with the historical average of the 3-month T-bill rate. 29 The weight of leisure relative to consumption in worker utility, , is chosen to deliver L = 1=3 absent shocks and frictions. The elasticity parameter in the production function, , is set to be 1=2, implying an asset-net worth ratio of about 2 for the …rms (see Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999) . 30 Normalizing K = 1 and K b = 0, the value of is set to be 0:076, which matches the historical average of an asset-net worth ratio of 13:18 for U.S. commercial banks. 31 The monitoring cost parameter, , is set to be 0: 36. 32 Similar to the bank/region speci…c productivity, we assume that the …rm/location speci…c productivity ! follows a unit-mean log-normal distribution on (0; 1), completed with the assignment of a zero p.d.f. for ! = 0. For ! > 0, log (!) N 1 2 2 ! ; 2 ! . We assume that ! is …xed, while follows the speci…cation in (24) . The value of ! and the mean value of , i.e., , are chosen to match (1) a spread between the …rms' borrowing rate and the risk-free rate of 293 basis points per annum, and (2) a spread between the banks'borrowing rate and the risk-free rate of 75 basis points per annum. 33 to the case where the policy reacts in the optimal fashion described above. As can be seen from the no-reaction lines, the e¤ect of a positive (resp. negative) shock to banking riskiness is to raise (resp. lower) q and reduce (resp. increase) L. The e¤ects are asymmetric in that the e¤ects of positive shocks are stronger. This is because negative shocks drive the economy toward the situation without banking frictions, which provides the limit for the strength of the e¤ects. The nonlinearity is also evident from the larger marginal e¤ects of positive shocks (the dashed lines are steeper to the right of " = 0). 34 
Conclusions
This paper develops a general equilibrium framework with banking frictions and two-sided …nancial contracting. The framework is used to analyze the e¤ects of bank recapitalization, taking the form of nominal capital transfers to the banking system. The design of optimal stabilization policy, in relation to the riskiness of banking, is also investigated. The paper contributes to understanding the transmission mechanisms of the unconventional monetary policy measures adopted during the GFC, and to understanding how policy should be designed to mitigate the adverse e¤ects of …nancial shocks. 3 4 Krasa, Sharma, and Villamil (2008) analyze agents' incentives to default and show that the enforcement parameters in their model can generate a sharply nonlinear e¤ect on …rm …nance. 3 5 The approximate linearity obtains since the marginal employment e¤ect of x is also weaker when the marginal employment e¤ect of " is weaker, i.e., when banking is less risky.
Although our study has mainly concerned the e¤ects of bank recapitalization by the monetary authority and the analysis has been carried out in a highly stylized model, the theoretical framework can be extended to study a wide spectrum of issues related to policy and regulation, as well as the monetary transmission mechanism, in perhaps more realistic ways. First, nominal rigidities and richer dynamics, such as capital accumulation, can be introduced to allow for a quantitative assessment of the e¤ects of policy. Second, deposit insurance can be incorporated in order to study the e¤ects of raising the limit of deposit insurance, as was implemented in the U.S. in 2008. 36 Third, one can consider situations where some sort of capital adequacy requirements bind. In those situations, bank recapitalization policy may work through relaxing these constraints. Fourth, the model can be extended to allow changes in asset prices to a¤ect the net worth of banks (and …rms), as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Rostagno (2003, 2009 ). Finally, our analysis can be extended to include credit rationing as a possible equilibrium outcome as in Williamson (1986) so that another dimension in which policy exerts in ‡uence on the economy can be explored. 37 We conclude that thorough analysis of frictions in the banking sector should be an integral part of future research on the interaction of money, …nance, and the macroeconomy.
Derivation of the Optimality Conditions for Problem 1.
We …rst show that conditions (9)-(12) hold. In the derivation below we impose the fact that M d N d = 0 in equilibrium to simplify notations, without neglecting the necessity to take derivatives via the term R M d N d =P 2 . Let b and d be the Lagrangian multipliers for (6) and (7), respectively. With U ( ) taking the log-form, the …rst-order conditions with respect to ! and are
The …rst-order conditions with respect to k and l are given by (9) and (10), where
:
Substitution of (A3) and (A4) into the above de…nition gives the expression of q in terms of ! and as in (13) .
At the optimum constraints (6) and (7) bind, implying
Substituting (A5) into (A6) yields (11) .
To derive (12) , note that the linear homogeneity of F ( ) together with (9) and (10) imply
Substituting (A.7) and the equality version of (8) into (A5) yields (12) .
We then show that lim !; !0 q = 1 and that q increases with ! and , hence q > 1 for all
To sign the above expression we consider two cases. Case 1: lim !!0 l ( !) > 0. In this case lim !!0 b0 ( !) f 00 ( !) b00 ( !) f 0 ( !) = lim !!0 l ( !) < 0. Case 2: lim !!0 l ( !) = 0. But Assumption 1(a) requires l ( ) to be positive, bounded, and continuously di¤erentiable on (0; 1). Hence in this case we must have lim !!0 l0 ( !) > 0. This means that for ! positive and su¢ ciently close to 0, we have l ( !) > 0 and l0 ( !) > 0 and hence b0 ( !) f 00 ( !) b00 ( !) f 0 ( !) < 0. In both cases when ! is positive and su¢ ciently close to 0, we have @% 1 =@ ! < 0 and hence @q=@ ! > 0.
Now look at the term { . Using (14) and (15), we have We therefore conclude that d{ 1 =d < 0 or d{=d > 0 and hence @q=@ > 0 in the neighborhood of = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.
To prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, …rst note that a solution to (17) for exists and is unique. This is because i = 1. Given , a solution to (18) for ! also exists and is unique. This is because both q !; and b ( !) are increasing in ! in the neighborhood of ! = 0 and lim !!0 q !; b ( !) = 0. Given and !, it remains to show that a solution to condition (19) exists and is unique. This is because F l (K; L) is monotonically decreasing in L,
with lim L!0 F l (K; L) = 1 and lim L!1 F l (K; L) = 0 and q !; R > 0 is independent of L.
To see how an increase in z b a¤ects L, note that from (17), an increase in z b (with a corresponding decrease in z d ) lowers . As for the change in ! there are two cases. Case 1. ! does not increase. In this case q !; obviously decreases since q is increasing in both arguments in the neighborhood of !; = 0. Case 2. ! increases. In this case condition (18) implies that q must decrease since b increases as a result of the decrease in , b ( !) increases as a result of the increase in !, and the right hand side of this condition decreases as a result of the decrease in z b . Thus in both cases q declines. Condition (19) then implies an increase in L. Q.E.D. Note: The horizontal axes represent the banking riskiness shock ε, i.e., deviation of banking riskiness σ θ from its mean value 0.031. The top panel plots the optimal value of x as a function of ε. The middle panel shows the effect of ε on the financial friction indicator q, measured in percentage point deviations from its mean value. The bottom panel shows the effect of ε on the equilibrium quantity of labor L, measured in percent deviations from its mean value. The dashed lines in the latter two panels correspond to the case of no reaction, i.e., x=0 identically, while the solid lines correspond to the case where the optimal reaction of x to ε is followed. 
